Global Drones Race

The rapid evolution of drone technology has transformed modern warfare, surveillance, and even geopolitics, positioning unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related systems like robot dogs as critical tools in both state and non-state arsenals. From targeted assassinations to overwhelming defense systems, drones have redefined conflict dynamics, with major manufacturing nations driving an unprecedented arms race. This essay explores the leading drone-producing countries, estimates their production rates, examines the use of drones in targeted killings and mass swarm tactics, and predicts potential scenarios if major powers engage in proxy wars or a global conflict like World War III, factoring in the latest advancements in drone and robot-dog technology.

Leading Drone Manufacturing CountriesIn 2025, the global drone industry is a cornerstone of national security, logistics, and commercial applications, with a projected market value of $63.6 billion and a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 10.1% through 2034. The top drone manufacturing countries, based on production capacity, technological innovation, and market share, are:

1. China: China dominates the global drone market, commanding over 70% of the consumer and commercial drone sector, led by SZ DJI Technology Co., Ltd. In 2025, China’s consumer electronics drone segment alone generates $1.53 billion, with total civilian drone production exceeding 200 billion yuan (~$27.5 billion). Companies like DJI, Autel Robotics, and EHang produce over 300 drone models, exporting nearly 40 million units annually, including 600,000 to the U.S. Low production costs, government subsidies (e.g., $30 billion for EV and drone manufacturing), and a robust supply chain give China an edge. However, concerns over cybersecurity and reliance on Chinese components have spurred other nations to diversify.

2. United States: The U.S. leads in military and high-end commercial drones, with an estimated 13,000 military UAVs in 2025. Companies like AeroVironment, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and Skydio produce advanced systems like the MQ-9 Reaper and autonomous drones for public safety. The U.S. commercial drone market is growing at a CAGR of over 8% through 2030, supported by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. High production costs—three times those of China—limit consumer drone output, but Department of Defense (DoD) contracts drive innovation.

3. Turkey: Turkey has emerged as a military drone powerhouse, with Baykar’s Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı drones gaining global recognition for battlefield success. Turkey’s focus on indigenous production enhances strategic autonomy, making its cost-effective drones attractive to international buyers, boosting its geopolitical influence.

4. Ukraine: Ukraine has revolutionized drone manufacturing, scaling to produce up to 10 million drones annually by 2025, driven by the Russia-Ukraine war. These battle-tested UAVs, including first-person view (FPV) drones, are cost-effective and account for 80% of battlefield attacks. Over 150 manufacturers, from state enterprises to volunteer workshops, produce drones like the Palianytsia missile-drone hybrid, with monthly output rising from 20,000 in early 2024 to 200,000 by January 2025.

5. France, Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, Canada: These nations contribute significantly, with France (Parrot, Thales), Germany (Flyability, Helsing), India (IdeaForge), Japan (Yamaha, ACSL), South Korea (Hanwha Systems), and Canada focusing on commercial, agricultural, and niche military applications. India aims for a $23 billion drone market by 2030, while Japan and South Korea integrate drones with IoT and 5G.

Other notable players include Israel (IAI, Rafael), Austria (Schiebel), and Russia (Kronstadt), though Russia’s commercial sector lags due to sanctions.

Drone Production Rates

Estimating precise drone production rates is challenging due to varying definitions (e.g., consumer vs. military drones) and limited public data, but available figures provide insight:

• China: Produces ~40 million drones annually, including consumer, commercial, and dual-use models. Assuming a 70% market share of the $63.6 billion global market, China’s output likely exceeds 28 million consumer/commercial drones and millions of military-grade units, given its role in supplying Russia’s Shahed drones.

• Ukraine: Targets 10 million drones in 2025, with 5 million FPV drones if funded. In 2024, Ukraine produced 2.2 million drones against a 1 million target, suggesting a monthly rate of ~833,000 in 2025 (10 million ÷ 12).

• Russia: Aims for 3–4 million drones in 2025, primarily Shahed-style and FPV drones, with weekly launches escalating from 200 to 1,000 by March 2025, implying an annual production of ~3.5 million units.

• United States: Produces ~13,000 military UAVs annually, with commercial output in the tens of thousands due to high costs. Precise figures are less clear, but DoD contracts suggest steady growth.

• Turkey, India, Others: Turkey exports thousands of Bayraktar drones annually, while India’s output is in the tens of thousands, with plans to scale significantly. France, Germany, Japan, and South Korea each produce thousands of specialized drones, but exact rates are not publicly detailed.

Global production likely exceeds 50 million drones annually, with China and Ukraine leading in volume, followed by Russia, while the U.S. and others focus on high-end systems.

Drones have become a preferred tool for targeted assassinations due to their precision, low risk to operators, and accessibility. Over 90 countries now use drones for combat or reconnaissance, enabling strikes without endangering human pilots. Notable examples include:

• U.S. Operations: The U.S. has used MQ-9 Reaper drones for high-profile assassinations, such as the 2020 killing of Qasem Soleimani in Iraq. These strikes leverage advanced sensors and long endurance for precise targeting, though they often provoke controversy over civilian casualties and sovereignty violations.

• Israel: Israel’s Harop and Spike FireFly loitering munitions, produced by IAI and Rafael, are designed for precision strikes. Israel has used drones for targeted killings in conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah, often bypassing traditional defenses due to their small size and maneuverability.

• Non-State Actors: The Islamic State used modified DJI Mavic drones for grenade-dropping attacks in Iraq (2014–2017), demonstrating how commercial drones can be weaponized. Violent extremist organizations (VEOs) increasingly acquire drones from battlefields or illegal channels, posing a growing terrorist threat.

Drones’ affordability ($500–$50,000 for FPV or Shahed drones vs. millions for manned aircraft) and adaptability (e.g., 3D-printed payloads) make them ideal for assassinations, especially in asymmetric warfare.

Mass drone swarms, particularly low-cost models like Russia’s Shahed drones, are designed to overwhelm air defenses through sheer numbers, a tactic known as “drone saturation.” Russia’s campaign against Ukraine exemplifies this:

• Shahed Drones: Costing $20,000–$50,000 each, Shahed drones are far cheaper than interceptors (e.g., $500,000 SAMs). Russia’s launches escalated from 200 to 1,000 per week by March 2025, with 75% occurring on consecutive days, saturating Ukraine’s defenses. Despite high interception rates (80–90%), the volume stresses systems and civilian morale, with 110 successful hits weekly by early 2025.

• Israel’s Iron Dome: Israel’s Iron Dome, designed for short-range rocket defense, struggles against drone swarms. Low-cost drones like Iran’s Shahed or Houthi variants, used in Red Sea attacks, exploit cost-exchange imbalances, forcing defenders to spend millions to counter thousands. Israel’s Iron Beam, a directed-energy counter-drone system, is under development to address this, but swarms remain a challenge.

• Technological Enablers: AI-driven swarm coordination, as seen in Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb (June 2025), allows dozens of drones to strike simultaneously, damaging Russian airfields. Additive manufacturing (3D printing) and modular open systems architecture (MOSA) enable rapid, scalable production, while AI enhances navigation and targeting, making swarms harder to jam.

This shift toward attrition warfare, where volume trumps precision, threatens even advanced defenses, as seen in Ukraine and the Middle East.

Recent advancements amplify drones’ and robot dogs’ battlefield impact:

• Drones: AI enables autonomous navigation in GPS-denied environments, automated target recognition, and swarm coordination. 3D printing, used by companies like Firestorm Labs, allows on-site production, reducing logistics costs. Fiber-optic control systems and jet-powered drones like Russia’s Geran3 (2,500 km range, 550–600 km/h) resist jamming and increase lethality. Ukraine’s Palianytsia hybrid (3,000 km range) and Germany’s HX-2 strike drone exemplify rapid innovation.

• Robot Dogs: These ground-based systems, like those from Ghost Robotics or China’s Unitree, are increasingly deployed for reconnaissance, logistics, and combat. Equipped with AI, thermal imaging, and modular payloads (e.g., rifles, explosives), they complement drones in urban and rugged terrains. Ukraine has tested robot dogs for mine detection, while China integrates them with drone swarms for combined arms operations.

Killer robots and swarming drones

A July 5, 2021 Foreign Policy headline: Killer Flying Robots Are Here. What Do We Do Now? The sub-title reads: A new generation of AI-enabled drones could be used to terrible ends by rogue states, criminal groups, and psychopaths.

Another July 2021 article is headlined: Israel’s Drone Swarm Over Gaza Should Worry Everyone. It makes it clear the problem is far broader, encompassing potentially highly problematic uses by any state with the requisite capability. He writes: “In a world first, Israel used a true drone swarm in combat during the conflict in May with Hamas in Gaza…It was a significant new benchmark in drone technology, and it should be a wakeup call for the United States and its allies to mitigate the risk these weapons create for national defense and global stability.”

The Foreign Policy article highlights two extremely destabilizing developments:

• the ability of drones (like the Turkish-made Kargu-2 quadcopter) to “allegedly autonomously track and kill human targets on the basis of facial recognition and artificial intelligence” and

• the use of “swarms” of drones, with potentially a high degree of internal coordination, based on a “swarming algorithm” that is based on the flocking behaviour of birds and other collective movements of fish and insects.

A new weapon of mass destruction

Both articles compare drone swarms to weapons of mass destruction, with Kallenborn providing this succinct rationale in an earlier article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: “drone swarms combine two properties unique to traditional weapons of mass destruction: mass harm and a lack of control to ensure the weapons do not harm civilians.”

In his latest article he identifies the further, fundamental problem: As drone swarms scale into super-swarms of 1,000 or even up to a million drones, no human could plausibly have meaningful control. “That’s a problem, autonomous weapons can only make limited judgments on the civilian or military nature of their targets.”

With lower costs, enhanced autonomy, and scalable, networked warfare reshaping conflict dynamics, there are new scenarios for proxy war or direct confrontation by major powers like the U.S., China, Russia, and NATO allies. Three likely scenarios include:

1. Proxy War in a Contested Region (e.g., Middle East or Africa):

   • Context: Major powers back opposing factions, as seen in Ukraine or Yemen, supplying drones and robot dogs to proxies. China could provide Shahed-style drones to Iran-aligned groups, while the U.S. equips allies like Israel or Saudi Arabia with MQ-9 Reapers and Anduril’s Altius drones.

   • Dynamics: Swarms of low-cost drones (e.g., $500 FPV units) overwhelm defenses, targeting infrastructure and military assets. Robot dogs, used for border patrols or urban combat, enhance ground operations. Non-state actors, acquiring drones from battlefields, escalate asymmetric attacks, complicating counterterrorism.

   • Outcome: Escalation risks spill-over, with powers like Turkey or India gaining influence as drone suppliers. Cyberattacks targeting drone control systems could disrupt operations, while international calls for drone proliferation controls grow.

2. Regional Conflict with Drone Saturation (e.g., Taiwan Strait):

   • Context: A China-U.S. proxy conflict over Taiwan sees massive drone deployments. China’s 40 million annual drone output floods the battlespace, while the U.S. leverages high-end systems and allies like Japan and South Korea.

   • Dynamics: China’s AI-driven swarms and robot dogs overwhelm Taiwan’s defenses, targeting ships and airfields. The U.S. counters with directed-energy weapons (e.g., Iron Beam equivalents) and autonomous drones like Skydio’s. Naval drone swarms, as tested by Ukraine in the Black Sea, disrupt shipping lanes.

   • Outcome: The conflict escalates costs, with interceptors depleted faster than drones can be produced. Neutral powers like India may tip the balance by supplying drones, while global trade faces disruptions. A stalemate could force negotiations, but miscalculations risk broader war.

3. Global Conflict (WWIII):

   • Context: A NATO-Russia-China conflict erupts, possibly sparked by Ukraine or Taiwan. Drones and robot dogs dominate early engagements, with Russia’s 3–4 million Shahed drones and Ukraine’s 10 million UAVs setting the pace.

   • Dynamics: Swarms overwhelm air defenses globally, targeting cities and infrastructure. Robot dogs, equipped with AI and explosives, conduct urban warfare, as seen in Ukraine’s mine-clearing experiments. Hyperscale production (e.g., Anduril’s Barracuda) and 3D-printed munitions enable rapid escalation. Cyberattacks and electronic warfare disrupt drone networks, but AI autonomy mitigates losses.

   • Outcome: The war becomes attritional, with economic collapse and civilian suffering due to infrastructure targeting. Smaller powers like Turkey and India exploit the chaos to expand influence. International controls fail, and non-state actors acquire advanced drones, prolonging instability.

The drone arms race, led by the U.S., China, Israel, Russia, Ukraine and others has made UAVs and robot dogs pivotal in modern warfare. China’s 40 million drones annually and Ukraine’s 10 million underscore the scale, while targeted assassinations and swarm tactics, as seen in Ukraine and the Middle East, highlight their disruptive power. Advances in AI, 3D printing, and modular systems amplify these threats, challenging defenses. In proxy wars or a global conflict, drones and robot dogs could dictate outcomes, from regional stalemates to catastrophic attrition. To mitigate these risks, goes one argument, nations must invest in cost-effective countermeasures (e.g., lasers, electronic warfare) and enforce proliferation controls, lest the democratization of air power usher in a new era of chaos. That should keep the Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex in business.